

LT Col Mark E Stewart  
Capt Daniel L  
Warner

~~SECRET~~ RELOAN

Stewart

83-85 And

To An  
86-90 HQ Langley  
Targeting PACAF 90-93  
An Support Operations Center  
DS/DS

93 Bio off

95 → To The Presence

9/11 Info

May Edick

Russian Strategic threat  
→ fly S. of Iceland

Russian NOTAMS

→ correlated w/ our exercises

9 Sep 02 Daily Brief  
0 Zero Terrorist threat

Check

14 Jul 02 UBL Threat Brief

CONR

Summer Terrorist Threat

called

FBI

STOC

2 or 3 calls

no LES

0840

MMIC AF Rep

CONR Maj Belton

~~Advised~~ } no Intel

Briefing 99  
00  
01 } thru 1AF

SPADS → Maj Glenn  
Maj Clegg → NORAD J2  
WTT  
LT for Schauer

AFIN  
Capt Kelm

Fertile SPADS live targets  
Fertile GAMES simulated

Fertile  
4 AUG 01 Rice Ops Floor

Newhouse list of Nuke Sites  
+ list of critical infrastructure  
& ability to display + open air  
venues  
e.g. Baseball  
Games  
working w/ NORAD  
for status list

Lacking  
TSA  
NSA NSOC  
JTF TC  
TEETK } No need  
Secret  
& Secret Release  
Chats

Intel has to be used based not remembered

USA → DC

2-4 mi ↓  
NORAD

3 min = 21 miles re scrambles  
on a good day 7-10 min to scramble

Paradigm

LE — see little law enforcement info.  
bulk of stuff foreign intel  
don't get anything direct from T&E/C  
or direct warning reports

10/30/03 Interview of Colonel Stuart

- HCS / SCI Lead
- 12 yrs. Active duty 1983-1995
- 1983-86 - flew w/ Airborne Battle Control Center
- ~~1986~~ 1986-90 - HQ Langley
- 1990-93 - Worked in Desert Storm → Intel. officer assigned to Air Support operation.
- 1995 - Came to Neads.
- 20 yrs. Total Active duty.
- 1995 - Present → He has been the NEADS Intel. officer.
- On 9/11 → Chief Intel. officer.
- He was in BC on 9/11 in Intel. position b/c of exercise.



~~secret~~ - Kilcan here  
↓

\* However, he was most interested in the Russian Bear Exercise (south of Greenland, Iceland, etc.)  
↳ north Atlantic area.

- Russians issued advance notice of their exercise.

- First time in 10 yrs. Russians did this.

- 7/9/01 → Daily brief NEADS puts together ↓

Zero terrorist threat information related to CONUS. = (no specific terrorist intel).

- 7/14/01 - CONUS region → developed a Bin Laden threat brief.

- Al ~~Q~~ Qaeda and Bin Laden threat brief increased in late summer of 2001. → This was briefed at NEADS.

- He did not have a SKIFF area in his Bldg on 9-11.

- Secret NoFORN level → NEADS operated at this level on 9-11.
- They could go to Rome jobs to use their facilities to go to SECRET NOFORN level on 9-11.
- Rome jobs had JWCIS. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Capabilities system.
- Sometime in 2002 → The NEADS ship was activated. (Pre 9-11 → ~~there was a~~ process to establish ship had begun).
- On 9/11 → he had the <sup>disclosure</sup> authority to release Secret NoFORN level info to Canadian forces at NEADS.
- A lot of trainees were in the BC positions.
- The FO on 9/11 = probably Col. Daniels
- Ask for Sector Roster.

before 1<sup>st</sup> hijack  
and after 7:30 AM.

— He talked TO NORAD (on the chat log)  
and TO CONUS CONR on the red  
switch ~~the~~ phone. = (A DRSN phone but  
not a STU III phone).

↓  
— No mention of a terrorist threat  
from NORAD or CONR prior to  
1<sup>st</sup> hijack.

— He called FBI SIOC TO report  
First hijack (AAL 11).

↓  
— FBI SIOC had ~~no~~ no info  
TO give them to shed light  
on the nature of the AAL 11  
hijacking.

— He had TO use his personal CC TO  
call FBI SIOC (long distance)  
from the STU phone on his desk.

— He then called NMJIC TO  
talk TO the Air Force rep. →  
They had no intel. information.

— He called CONR on red switch  
and Major Del Toro had no intel.  
information.



- He told BC man they had no intel info.
- He asked major Edick to check the Siplanet for intel.
- The sum total of intel. he rec'd ~~the~~ on 9/11 was zero.
- He (and ~~major~~ major Postins) watched AA 77 hit the Pentagon from the ACWO scope.
- Stuart thought UAL 93 was going to hit the Sears Tower before it turned towards the East.
- He was standing next to Col. Mann when General Arnold gave Mann authority to engage A/C with force to shoot down ~~any~~ ~~airliner~~ ~~that~~ ~~was~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~  ~~Pentagon~~.
- The call came in from ~~the~~ CONR over the red switch.
- Col. Mann rec'd call from General Eberhardt ~~Arnold~~. → ~~Arnold~~ ~~of~~ Eberhardt ~~id~~ V.P. wanted to know if needs shot down UAL 93. Mann said NO.



- After UAL 93 turned → he and other NEADS people knew it was headed to D.C.

His view  
08 → Weapons free zone = ~~anything~~  
Any A/C that enters the zone is subject to being engaged/shot down.

- FBI never visited NEADS post 9-11 to get information to his knowledge.

✓ ~~#B~~ OSI - Office of Special Investigations talked to ~~a~~ him.

- Ask Colonel McNeely about ~~his~~ his AFIO views post 9-11.

- 1999 <sup>the 2001</sup> → he has briefings ~~and~~ and does on his computer ~~concerning~~ raising concerns about terrorists ~~using~~ using A/C as weapons to crash into WDC. ↓

NORAD J-2 Conference.  
First AF Conference.

ask the First AF <sup>Intell</sup> IN. →  
Colonel Glenn (Retired)  
what happened to Col. Stuart's  
concerns over terrorist activity  
(e.g. using planes as WMD).

→ Also ask the NORAD J-2  
Capt. Kuhn

— SEADS Intel, Major Clegg

— WADS Intel, Lt. Col. Shawer

— He believed the terrorist  
would hijack the A/C from  
Overseas and use it as a WMD.

↳ (never thought the A/C would  
be hijacked from inside U.S.)

— never dreamed of multiple  
hijack scenarios — only single event.

→ b/c he believed foreign airports  
(like Italy) had very porous  
security.

- ~~Any Intel~~
- He envisioned Terrorists taking over planes and piloting them at the last possible moment as they crashed.
  - 8/4/01 - RICE exercise → ~~for~~ on ops floor exercise.  
↳ he has a briefing for that on his computer.
  - Intel is better today but it could be better.
  - Post 9-11 → NEADS worked with NRC - nuclear reg. Comm to get list of ~~its~~ sites and tel. #s for nuclear sites in NEADS area.  
↳ They also looked at protecting other critical infrastructure sites → (e.g. Sporting events, concerts, large outdoor events).  
↓  
Assessing vulnerability of Targets. (chemical plants, etc.)



- He suggests getting TTIC and other intel sources linked on a natl. and secret bus.

- Intelligence can't be a hierarchical struggle any more.

{ Changes needed → They see very little U.S. law enforcement information b/c of the way the FBI ~~conducts~~ conducts its business.

→ This Paradigm has to change

- He does not receive any direct CIA warning reports at his level (they are filtered).

- He does not receive TTIC information.

- The military still must pull teeth to get information from U.S. law enforcement side of world.



(I.S. he has to hear about  
Buffalo's terror cell being arrested  
via the news.)

Secret Rercan

14

~~STE~~, ~~ANAN~~

Col STUART

12 yrs Active DUTY 83-95

83-86 Flier 7<sup>th</sup> AGS Airborn Battlefied Comm & contr

86-90 RUSSIAN AIR ANALYST LANGLEY

TARGET IN SCHOOL

THREATENING OFFICER 90-93 Airsupport of center  
desert storm

93 PERSONAL OF RANDOLPH AFB

95 @ NEADS

95 → Present NEADS Intel office

9/11 → Intel officer ON duty @ Battle CAD  
MAJOR edic → assistant

STUART was more focused on the Russian Bears

OTIS went increase fuel & missiles

Ground, uh, ice and sup > 1<sup>st</sup> in 10 yrs

NOTIN → NOTIFICATION FOR AIRSIDE

BUSH Discussion of Nat'l Miss defense

Russians Forwarded Assets to Arctic bases

2 the assets available US was "leaving forward"

Alert Force

9/11 → zero intel available on increase in terrorist threat level

14 JULY 01 → Bin Laden threat brief

Prep'd at COM NORAD

CENT COM in JULY went to higher threat level

Career

AVAIL  
Briefing

did n.t have SCIF facilities @ ~~some~~ NEAD,  
or @ secret level, some LABS had SCIF

JOINT Worldwide Intelligence communication system → JWICS

after 9/11 operating space, in '02, changed to SCIF. IT  
was in process of happening, communication Node  
was accelerated.

on 9/11 Stuart states that intelligence was @ an  
operable level.

STUART makes judgement ~~call~~ call to disclose information  
to Canadian MCCs. Called "disclosure authority"

Had a lot of training positions. M. Sanderson in  
FO. Perkins in AWOL. Brian Daniels as FO. ~~to~~ No  
DO in DO slot. Col Con & M'Neely were off shift.  
Col Daniels may have been DO and FO.

→ Sector has duty roster for 9/11

Aires & Culbertson were both there as well.

around 7:30 talked to CONR & NORAD to update  
on "real world". Spoke to MAJ. Oeltoro (1st AF).  
Talked to NORAD on chat log, with ~~NORAD~~ CONR

on red phone. ~~DRS~~ DRS

No change in terrorist threat warning.

after hijack call, called FBI SIOC. Handed to 2 or 3 individuals. Stuart explained & asked for law enforcement info - they had nothing.

FBI: "OH SHIT, I HAVE TO GO" - HANG UP. Made call to personal credit card. ~~SE~~ → doesn't have the card slip. Time was probably ~~8:48~~ 8:48.

Talked to AIR Force Desk at the NIMJIG.

They ~~do~~ didn't have any information.

Called CONR Red switch MAJ DELTARO → they had no info.

Stuart advised MARR no info. US CIPernet searched by MAJOR EDICK (DEPUTY). No information that morning or afternoon.

Watched Pentagon hit to MAJOR Deshams. She was explaining.

Flight 93 → Stuart gave advise that Sears Tower was likely target. Subsequently heard Sears Tower being evacuated.

Stuart was to MARR when got call from Ahmad



authorizing engagement of aircraft, passed from White House.

Col Mann later on asked if shoot down 93,  
and Mann said unequivocally "no" on phone to  
Arnold or Eberhart > one was on Line 2 VP.

### Operational Awareness

~~Does~~ Remember floor trying to find AA11.  
Seemed clear that flights from Dos hit NT.  
Only aircraft he gave a recommendation on  
was 93. Thought Sears since it wouldn't make sense  
given first two hits for flight to turn back.

Once it turned back to him he was headed to DC.

"Weapons Free Zone" → anything that came in and  
~~can~~ can be engaged.

Doesn't remember much on Delta flight or on a  
5<sup>th</sup> hijacking.

OK side did radar reduction.

Right after 9/11 in effort with ~~the~~ RBD, to get  
info on other aircraft. Was concerned of  
oversea grounded aircraft going airborne

~~Secret~~

TORONTO, ST. LOUIS, 2 individuals in St Louis took train after flight, to TEXAS and were apprehended in San Antonio. That's what intel was looking for.

TWA ~~was~~ ~~flight~~ 2 individuals who left gate area, @ JFK and were not detained.

Info flowed well in first few days but then narrowed everything

NO FBI, but local OSI (office special investigations) came to question MEADS.

Stuart concerned of Toronto, CA and Boston.

Concerned of Ground Threat (120 minutes from MEADS)  
& concern of AIR Threat

AFIO → knowledge Post 9/11. Fighters have to get out of cap quickly. No knowledge Pre-9/11.

On 9/11 no AFIO knowledge

ask memo  
on AFIO

24 March 1999 → briefings on use of aircraft onto  
computer to on terrorist threat of aircraft  
into building

briefed Do 79, '00, 01) logical progression  
from hijack, to exploding, to use of aircraft

1) NORAD J2 Conf

2) 1<sup>st</sup> AF IN Conf → MAJOR, COL TOM GLENN

'00 Recommend NORAD speak to NATL LAW  
enforcement agencies to coordinate

ONLY Personnel views

NO substantive intelligence

→ based on boldness of ABT terrorist actions

discussed to counterparts @ SEADS / WADS  
MAJ CLEGG / Lt Col Shaver

Briefed that hijack would be overseas inbound  
in all cases

never imagined it could happen inside US. STUART

Thought vulnerability security of overseas meant  
much more likely.

never imagined MULTIPLE HIJACK

INITIALLY 9/11 @ hijack internal didn't think of

~~Secret~~

Does think exercise of overseas m.  
 DID threat scenario of missile off of barge.  
 MULTIPLE exercises.  
 Focus never inside US.

didn't occur to Stuart that it could be for  
 additional fuel purposes.

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→ briefings presented related to Asymmetrical  
 threats @ J3, ~~J2~~ NORAD, 1st AF

Briefings <sup>J2</sup> IN CONFERENCE)

Briefings & minutes @ J3 ~~cont~~ cont

J2 → KUHN

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Stuart thought control would be taken @  
 last minute > @ end AIR crew  
 forced to leave cockpit

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BARGE Threat → 4 August 01

Ops Floor exercise → Bin Laden Reference

NOW: Intel better → "Push" it into instead of  
"pull"

CIA CT LINK  
(Counter-terrorism)

Intel can't provide imminent tactical warning.  
No traditional military threat. Intel gives sense  
of awareness provided to operators.

Work w/ nuclear regulatory commission, developed own  
list of critical infrastructure. Overviews display that  
point out critical targets

Secret-Recon ALSO → Pic all interest in sports events. Notice sports events  
on daily level.

Working through status for bio-chem, etc.

Trigger is any commercial aircraft that looks  
suspicious.

Lacking TSA, NSA, T-Tick (Langley) entities & on  
a dynamic chat @ Secret-Recon that will keep  
everything linked. Needs to be webbased, not hierarchal.

Need to have simultaneous intel for scramble

Secret

FALCON-VICH OVERCAMS

STUART has gotten excellent support from national agencies, on personal level.

LAW enforcement PARADIGM because of investigations needs to change. LAW enforcement is ad hoc through AF security force.

STUART does not receive anything directly from T-TIC. OR FROM CIA.

LAW enforcement to MILIT intelligence "is like pulling teeth"  
"they don't know who their new customers are"